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Abstract
Climate change has become intertwined with the global economy. Here, we describe
the importance of inertia to continued growth in energy consumption. Drawing from
thermodynamic arguments, and using 38 years of available statistics between 1980 to
2017, we find a persistent time-independent scaling between the historical time integral
W of world inflation-adjusted economic production Y , or W (t) =
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′, and
current rates of world primary energy consumption E , such that λ = E/W = 5.9± 0.1
Gigawatts per trillion 2010 US dollars. This empirical result implies that population
expansion is a symptom rather than a cause of the current exponential rise in E and
carbon dioxide emissions C, and that it is past innovation of economic production
efficiency Y/E that has been the primary driver of growth, at predicted rates that agree
well with data. Options for stabilizing C are then limited to rapid decarbonization of E
through sustained implementation of over one Gigawatt of renewable or nuclear power
capacity per day. Alternatively, assuming continued reliance on fossil fuels, civilization
could shift to a steady-state economy that devotes economic production exclusively to
maintenance rather than expansion. If this were instituted immediately, continual energy
consumption would still be required, so atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations
would not balance natural sinks until concentrations exceeded 500 ppmv, and double
pre-industrial levels if the steady-state was attained by 2030.
1 Thermodynamic overview of civilization growth
Like other biological systems [1], the human economy interacts with its surroundings
through flows of energy and matter [2,3]. Collectively, we mine primary energy resources,
and use the energy to power civilization and convert raw materials into the material
make-up of civilization or Earth’s “technosphere” [4]. The circulations of our lives
include the back-and-forth material exchange of people, goods, and information along
transportation and communication networks, and our cardiovascular, pulmonary and
nervous systems [5–8]. These require a power source, and any impulse of energy that
passes through these networks is ultimately dissipated through frictional losses as waste
heat. Concurrently, our infrastructure, bodies, and even our memories undergoes decay.
So, without a continual drawdown of primary energy and raw material resources to
continually rebuild civilization, it would inevitably fall apart.
While the entirety of humanity seems infinitely complex in its range of activities,
what all social phenomena have in common is their need for energy. The sum total
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Fig 1. Illustration of the short-term thermodynamic balance between primary energy
consumption E and dissipation at rate G/τd (Eq. 2) in a civilization experiencing
long-term, proportionate material n˘ and specific potential µ growth (Eq. 14).
of their power consumption is constrained by the world total, or the rate of primary
energy consumption E . By consuming primary energy, for example through combustion,
civilization is stretched to a potential G, higher than an equilibrium with the environment
characterized by G = 0 (Fig. 1).
This potential energy G is converted into civilization circulations by doing reversible
work Wrev to move civilization elements along pathways that align with the potential
gradient ∇G [9] and, through frictional losses, work is converted to waste heat that is
radiated to space. If the average velocity of the circulations is ~v , and no primary energy
is consumed, then the rate at which potential energy is dissipated is
Wrev = −dG
dt
= ~v · ∇G = G
τd
(1)
where the dissipation time is τd = 1/ (~v · ∇ lnG).
The reason civilization does not relax to an environmental equilibrium is that sustained
primary energy consumption continually elevates G. For example, oil is extracted from
a well for consumption, and there is back-pressure in the reserves to replenish supplies.
Available statistics [10] suggest that civilization has been consuming energy nearly as fast
as it has been produced. Since 1980, the mean ratio of global production to consumption
has been 0.998 with an annual standard deviation smaller than 1%. So, while G may
fluctuate because consumption and dissipation are out of phase over rapid timescales
shorter than τd, averaged over timescales a bit longer, say one week, these variations are
no longer apparent. Then, the quasi-equilibrium condition for civilization sustenance is:(
dG
dt
)sust
= Esust − G
τd
' 0 (2)
implying that Esust = G/τd is the required energy consumption to sustain civilization
circulations, or in terms of the thermodynamic First Law, to maintain a short-term
balance between external heating and doing reversible work Wrev.
Civilization has a wide range of activities, each with their own energetic demands
and timescales that could be characterized by a power spectrum of consumption Esustτ
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satisfying
Esust =
∫ ∞
0
Esustτ τdτ (3)
in which case the characteristic timescale for civilization is τd =
∫∞
0
Esustτ τdτ/Esust.
Given that approximately 40% of our time is spent alternating between our top two
preferred locations, (e.g. home and work) [11], τd might be taken to be about 1 day.
Currently, the world primary energy consumption rate is roughly 20 TW, so it follows
from the quasi-equilibrium relationship Eq. (2) that
G = Esustτd ' 20× 1012 J s−1 × 86400 s = 1.7× 1018 J, (4)
equivalent to the energy contained in 270 million barrels of oil.
Obviously, such high potential is a far cry from where we started in the Stone
Age. How did we become so strong? There has been no external hand to turn up the
civilization flame. Purely mathematically, reaching our current state meant accumulating
successive increments in potential G over civilization’s history:
G (t) =
∫ t
0
dG (t′)
dt′
dt′ (5)
Eq. 2 implies that the primary energy supply E must have been greater than humanity’s
collective metabolic needs Esust so that
dG
dt
=
G
τlong
= E − Esust > 0 (6)
An important point here is that civilization growth timescales τlong are decades to
centuries, that is, much longer than τd. For example, recent growth rates of global
primary energy consumption are approximately 2% per year (or equivalent to τlong ' 50
years), so the implied difference between E and Esust is only about 0.01%. Such growth
might be imperceptible in our daily lives, but it does slowly accumulate. We can therefore
write
Esust = (1− )E , (7)
where  = τd/(τd + τlong) 1, so that the approximation E ' Esust can be made that
at any given time. For the remainder of E , we have
Wirr = dG
dt
= E , (8)
so that  can be seen to be the efficiency of converting primary energy consumption E to
the irreversible work Wirr that enables growth. Note how the sign on Wirr is opposite
to that in Eq. 1, where potential energy is dissipated to do the reversible work Wrev
that maintains civilization circulations. Instead, irreversible work is done to grow the
civilization potential G. Moreover, it follows that the growth rate of the potential is
given by
ηG :=
d lnG
dt
=
1
G
dG
dt
=
1
τlong
=

(1− )τd '

τd
(9)
Similarly, taking the derivative of
E = E
sust
1−  =
G
(1− )τd (10)
we find that the growth rate of primary energy consumption is
ηE :=
d ln E
dt
=
1
E
dE
dt
=

(1− )τd (1 + τdη) '

τd
(11)
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where
η :=
d ln 
dt
(12)
is the growth rate of  and τdη  1.
The mechanism through which an imbalance leading to Wirr > 0 should emerge
is not discussed in detail here. It follows from discovering accessible energy resources
faster than they are consumed [12, 13]. The gradient ∇G becomes steeper nearer
the energy source than to the dissipative sink, so that there is a net convergence of
energy in civilization. Very generally, this process is analogous to the heat equation
(dG/dt)long = ∇ · (D∇G) = D∇2G, where D is a constant diffusivity.
For more intuitive insight, consider a child as a more familiar complex system. From
Eq. 2, a child with potential G has quasi-equilibrium metabolic needs of Esust = G/τd
– say about 50 Watts, or about 500 kJ per day per kg. Any food energy the child
consumes is used to do reversible work Wrev to maintain rapid internal neurological,
respiratory, cardiovascular, and nervous circulations and to reconstitute food nutrients
into its material makeup. If the energy in the proteins, carbohydrates and fats of
accessible food is only just sufficient to offset decay and keep the child alive, then the
child is at steady-state and G and Esust do not change. A healthy child, however, does
net irreversible work at rate Wirr = E to convert some small portion of the energy in
food into accumulation of body matter through a conversion factor of about 30 MJ kg−1.
The child eventually becomes a robust adult with higher daily energy demands and the
growth rate (hopefully) stabilizes. But even then, a typical rate of weight gain translates
to a value of W irr/W rev of about 0.2%, while seemingly tiny, results in a 10 kg gain in
mass, or 300 MJ of energy, over the 50 years span of a typical adult life [14].
This treatment suggests how to consider the coupling of energy and matter in an
open system such as civilization. G is a total potential, so it can be decomposed into
any arbitrary number of sub-components with G =
∑
n˘iµi, depending on how closely
civilization is resolved. Here we take the simplest possible approach which is to suppose,
as illustrated in Fig. 1, that the accessibility of energy by civilization can be defined by
an interface with resources composed of n˘ material elements each with average potential
µ, so that
G(t) = n˘(t)µ(t). (13)
Thus, civilization elements are not a purely additive summation of civilization “things”
n. Rather they represent a number of network nodes, defined in terms of people, firms,
or nations that collectively do work to dissipate energy at rate Esust.
It therefore follows from 8 and 13 that any long-term net convergence E is a surplus
that can be partitioned between manufacturing more civilization nodes or increasing
their average potential µ:
E =Wirr = dG
dt
= µ
dn˘
dt
+ n˘
dµ
dt
(14)
By increasing the average potential at rate dµ/dt, existing civilization elements n˘ can go
farther and faster. On the other hand, production of new civilization elements dn˘/dt
with average potential µ implies a phase change. Just as an excess 30 MJ of energy is
required for the chemical transformation of food into a kilogram of flesh, stationary raw
materials such as forests, fish stocks, and iron ore are rearranged into familiar forms
such as cars, roads, and communications systems.
We assume the following thermodynamic proportionality:
dµ
dn˘
= (k − 1)µ
n˘
(15)
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for a constant k. Substituting this into Eq. 14 leads to
Wirr = kµdn˘
dt
(16)
or rearranging, net production of network nodes is related to current energy consumption
through
dn˘
dt
=

kµ
E (17)
where / (kµ) is the efficiency of converting primary energy consumption to network
growth.
To summarize, we consume energy at rate E . Most of it, namely Esust = (1− )E , is
used to do reversible work at rateWrev to sustain circulations along civilization networks.
The surplus E is used to do irreversible work at rate Wirr to convert raw materials
into the stuff of humanity and extend existing network nodes at rate dn˘/dt. These form
the fabric of society, including roads, telecommunications networks and even neural
pathways encapsulating memories within our brains. We grow fastest if the efficiency
 is high. And through expansion of the physical interface at rate dn˘/dt with reserves
of energy and matter, civilization grows, leading recursively to further expansion and
higher consumption.
2 Thermodynamics of global economic value
Can these strictly thermodynamic concepts be linked to the economy expressible in
financial terms? Suppose for the moment that they can, and that there exists a
hypothetical global quantity expressible in units of real currency (or “widgets”) W
that expresses the size of civilization and is presumed to be proportional to energy
consumption and the civilization potential through a constant scaling factor λ:
G
τd
' E = λW (18)
In this expression, civilization elements of whatever kind contribute to W only insofar
as they contribute to the overall network capacity to dissipate primary potential energy
at rate E , requiring a thermodynamic potential G.
From a purely dimensional perspective, the simplest possible economically quantifiable
definition of W is that it is an integration over time of a global quantity with units of
widgets per time. The approach previously taken in [15] was to suppose that the most
obvious candidate is the world economic production Y (or gross domestic product GDP)
calculated at market exchange rates (MER) and adjusted for inflation, in which case W
is the world cumulative production:
W =
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′ (19)
From Eqs. 18 and 19, the testable hypothesis is that economic production aggregated
for all nations and integrated over all of history is tied through a constant λ to energy
consumption through:
E (t) = λ
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′ (20)
Note the similarity here with Eq. 5. If the expression in Eq. 20 can be shown to
empirically justified, it would imply that there is a constant relationship between
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inflation-adjusted economic production Y and a rise in global energy consumption
demands E :
Y =
dW
dt
=
1
λ
dE
dt
(21)
From Eqs. 11 and 17, we can see that economic production is tied to the use of primary
energy to do irreversible work to convert raw materials into civilization matter. Namely,
Y =
EηE
λ
' E
λτd
=
kµ
λτd
dn˘
dt
=
Wirr
λτd
(22)
In other words, with a surplus of energy E , the extraction of raw materials can be tied
to the production of economically useful material goods (namely “widgets”) as has been
noted previously in [16]. These add value by speeding up human activity and increasing
civilization size. Economic production provides the recipe for growth by expanding our
collective interface with energy and material reserves, leading to positive increments in
our capacity to consume.
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Fig 2. Evolution of world economic production Y in trillion 2010 USD per year (solid
line) and the integrated contribution to the world cumulative production W in trillion
2010 USD proportional to the shaded area under the curve. The period between 1980 to
2017 that is used for comparison with world primary energy consumption E as described
in the text is delineated by the dashed line and shown by the gray arrow.
Available data for testing Eq. 20 include annual market exchange rate estimates of
GDP, inflation-adjusted to “real” units (namely constant 2010 US dollars) from the World
Bank [17] and the United Nations [18] for the years 1970 to 2017, and reconstructions
from the Maddison database of the real GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity
(PPP) 1990 USD for each year between 1950 and 1992, with more sparse estimates
extending back to 1 CE [19] (see details in Appendix A). Annual rates of global primary
energy consumption E are available from British Petroleum and the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the time period 1980
to 2017 [10, 20]. For initialization of the integration in Eq. 19, it is estimated that
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world cumulative production in 1 C.E. was 250 trillion 2010 USD, a number that is
obtained iteratively so that there is consistency for that period between growth of W
and population growth rates of about 6% per century [21]. This reconstruction is about
7.3% of the value obtained for 2017, suggesting the ancient world had already evolved
non-negligible wealth in its Western, Middle Eastern, and Eastern empires [22]. The
Maddison database is sparse, and presumably increasingly uncertain the farther one
goes back in time. However, the value of W accumulated over the period 1 CE to 1000
CE is just 4.6% of the value in the year 2017. It is not until the last century that W (t)
grows appreciably (Figure 2). The world cumulative production between 1980 and 2017
comprises a remarkable 60% of the historically accumulated total.
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Fig 3. Relative evolution since 1980 of the world real GDP Y , economic potential
W =
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′ (Eq. 19), primary energy consumption E , λ = E/W (Eq. 18) and the
energy intensity of production E/Y .
Table 1. The global value of λ ((gigawatts per trillion 2010 US dollar with standard
deviation) defined by Eq. 18 for various time periods.
Period 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 2010-2017 1980-2010 1980-2017
λ = E/W 6.04±0.14 5.83±0.15 5.83±0.14 5.79±0.14 5.90±0.16 5.88±0.17
The relative evolution since 1980 of E , Y , W , λ = E/W and E/Y is shown in Figure
3 and summarized in Table 1. Expressing Eq. 20 as a summation of yearly data,
λj = Ej/
∑j
0 Yi, the mean value
1 of λ is 5.9 with a standard deviation of 0.1 (2%) and an
uncertainty in the mean at the 95% confidence level of 0.05 (0.8%). As an indicator of
the sensitivity to uncertainty in the data, assuming for the initializing of the integration
a value of W (1) double the previously derived value of 250 trillion 2010 USD, then
λ = 5.2 ± 0.2. If half as much, then λ = 6.2 ± 0.2. While there is arguably a small
secular downward trend of 0.1% yr−1, the temporal variation in λ is sufficiently small
and insensitive to assumptions that it appears useful as a scaling factor relating an
economic quantity W to a physical measure E . If τd ' 1 day, then the implication is
that G/W = λτd ' 510± 9 Joules per 2010 US dollar.
The relationship in Eq. 20 appears to hold empirically. But it might seem surprising
given that it lacks any explicit representation of the spontaneous appreciation or of con-
1All values for λ in this paragraph have units of gigawatts per trillion 2010 USD
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sumption, decay, and depreciation. Obviously, trade agreements and resource discovery
add value without being tabulated in production. And not all of what has been produced
remains as old technologies turn obsolete and networks fray due to physical destruction
by storms, rust, and forgetting. A cook may produce food in a restaurant, but other than
temporary body sustenance and lingering memories, the meal is gone. The total “wealth”
of civilization cannot be simply a summation of production. Equation 20 is easier to
justify, however, if there is exists a steady fraction of production that contributes to
civilization expansion through irreversible work, as in Eq. 22.
In traditional macroeconomic growth models, there is also a quantity with units of
widgets, termed real capital K that relates to real economic output Y according to some
production function Y = f (K,L) where L represent labor. A common example is the
Cobb-Douglas production function Y = AKαL1−α where α is determined from a fit
to data and A is termed a “total factor productivity” that can itself evolve with time
according to, for example, investments in research and development [23] (see also [24]
for a different interpretation of A in the context of a Cobb-Douglas production function
taking into account energy inputs). One could argue that the appropriate theoretical
relationship to draw is not between E and W as defined in Eq. 19, but between E and
capital K.
To explore this possibility further, observe that capital K evolves as
dK
dt
= I − δK = Y − C − δK (23)
where I = Y −C is gross investment, δ is a depreciation rate, and C refers to consumption
of goods that are assumed to depreciate much faster than capital itself. If we define γ as
the fraction of production used for consumption plus depreciation, that is
γY = C + δK, (24)
then Eq. 23 becomes dK/dt = (1− γ)Y , or equivalently,
K (t) =
∫ t
0
(1− γ (t′))Y (t′) dt′. (25)
Provided γ does not vary greatly in time, we can approximate the factor (1− γ) by its
time average 〈1− γ〉 so that
K ' 〈1− γ〉
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′. (26)
In other words, if there were a fundamental scaling between E and K, this would also
imply the scaling expressed in Eq. 20.
Then, if society experienced a sudden collapse in its growth toward a steady-state
economy with constant E , economic production Y could remain positive, even adjusting
for inflation, but the implication would be that all production would be used simply for
consumption and to sustain capital K at its current state, that is ot say, γ (t) = 1, and
both K and E are stationary.
Unfortunately long-term global time series to test whether K scales with E are scant,
in part because there is disagreement among economists about how to appropriately
aggregate the value of items as different as houses and tractors [25], and also because
of difficulties with estimating a starting point for the corresponding time series [26]
similarly to the difficulty we mentioned above related to W (1). Also, it is unclear what
to include because economic capital does not normally consider for example people or
their culture, even though these are core elements of the human dissipative engine. In
other words, whereas capital K and the global quantity W in Eq. 18 may be numerically
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related, they are not conceptually analogous. The value expressed by W lies not so much
in an aggregation of inert “things”, but in their summed capacity to form interconnected
networks through a thermodynamic potential G = n˘µ that sustains the dissipation of
potential energy at rate E , whether it is from international trade, housework, or the
firing of neuronal networks in human brains.
In the meantime, even if W calculated from Eq. 19 yields an overestimate of the true
aggregated wealth of civilization, λ as calculated in Eq. 20 has been nearly a constant
for sufficiently long that it seems reasonable to assume that this regularity will carry
into the future.
3 Implications for economic growth
Adopting a nearly fixed relationship between W and E offers a testable basis for exploring
thermodynamic constraints on economic growth. From Eqs. 19 and 20, both the world
cumulative production and primary energy consumption grow at the exponential rate:
ηE = ηW :=
1
W
dW
dt
=
Y
W
= λ
Y
E = λε (27)
where ε := Y/E is the energy efficiency of economic production or energy productivity.
That is to say, higher energy productivity is related with increased energy demands.
This result may seem counter-intuitive, but it rests only on the empirical result
that λ is a constant. It should not be confused with the concept of backfire or Jevons’
Paradox [27–29], which also argues that efficiency gains lead to consumption growth, but
is stated within the context of traditional economic models for specific economic sectors
or nations and is often refuted. Here, Eq. 27 applies strictly within a global context so
that complications due to trade do not play a role. Interpreted physically, Eq. 27 can be
compared with Eq. 22, suggesting that ε ' /λτd, or that energy productivity is related
to the efficiency of doing irreversible work Wirr = E that further expands the capacity
to consume. The implication is that civilization is an emergent phenomenon that grew
spontaneously to its currently high state of production through an energy surplus.
The decades following 1950 – known as the “great acceleration” – stand out in
particular, when a relative ease of access to oil led to rapid innovations [13, 30]. To
characterize acceleration in growth, ηW can be considered to have its own exponential
growth rate
ηI :=
d ln ηW
dt
(28)
We term this an “innovation rate” because From Eq. 27, if λ is a constant, ηI can also
be expressed as
ηI = ηε :=
d ln ε
dt
(29)
Whenever conditions support an increase in energy productivity ε (or thermodynamic
efficiency ), for example due to energy reserve discoveries [13], then ηI > 0 and
civilization growth is superexponential.
The world GDP growth rate ηY := d lnY/dt follows a slightly different pathway.
From Y = εE and Eq. 27, it follows that:
ηY = ηE + ηε = λε+ ηε (30)
At global levels, by reducing the energy required for manufacture of valuable goods,
civilization bootstraps through innovation to higher GDP growth and accelerating rates
of energy consumption.
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Table 2. Measured average growth rates (%/yr) compared with rates derived
assuming λ is a constant in bold. Pertinent equations are in parentheses.
Wealth Energy Innovation GDP
ηW ηE λε (27) ηI (28) ηε (29) ηY λε+ ηε (30)
1980-2010 2.06 1.98 2.09 0.82 0.91 2.88 3.0
2010-2017 2.33 1.60 2.40 0.45 1.18 2.78 3.58
1980-2017 2.14 1.84 2.15 0.73 1.0 2.84 3.15
Table 2 shows a check of the applicability of the derived growth equations 27 to 30
for the period between 1980 and 2010 and a shorter more recent period from 2010 to
2017. Overall, there is close agreement between observations and calculated rates of
change based on the constancy of λ suggesting the relationship offers a useful tool for
making simplified predictions. However, there are also some discrepancies after 2010.
For example, as stated in Eq. 27, a consequence of a constant value for λ is that the
primary energy consumption growth rate ηE should be equivalent to both the growth
rate of the world cumulative production ηW and the product λε. For the period 1980 to
2010 over which energy consumption increased by 80%, the three calculations differ by
at most 6%.
Similarly the GDP growth rate calculated from the expression λε + ηε (rightmost
in Eq. 30) agrees to within 4% with the directly calculated value ηY . However, for the
shorter period between 2010 and 2017, the agreement is less precise, and also for the
time period 1980 to 2017. The reason is unknown, although note from Table 2 and the
mathematical equivalency ηY = ηE + ηε that any discrepancy between ηY and λε+ ηε is
due entirely to discrepancies between ηE and λε. Energy consumption increased by just
11% between 2010 and 2017 so there is greater susceptibility to quantification errors.
Also, nominal GDP is what is measured, and any calculation of real Y requires an
accurate assessment of the GDP deflator that attempts to account for inflation, and its
true magnitude may have been underestimated. Indeed, λ = E/W was 2% lower in the
latter period (Table 1), and any departure from constancy affects calculation of higher
order derivatives such as the growth rates ηE and ηY .
4 Implications for carbon dioxide emissions and con-
centrations
4.1 Simplifications to socio-economic drivers
The anthropogenic contribution to atmospheric carbon dioxide emissions can be con-
veniently decomposed into the product of population P , affluence expressible as the
gross domestic product (GDP) per person g := Y/P , the energy intensity of economic
production i =: E/Y = 1ε, and the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by the choice of
energy source c := C/E , leading to the Kaya identity C = P × g× i× c [31]. In terms of
growth rates, we have
ηC = ηP + ηg − ηε + ηc (31)
The most recent IPPC report [32] lists rapid increases in population and standard
of living as primary drivers of past emissions growth but focuses on innovations that
improve production efficiency and reductions in the carbon intensity of fuels as targets
for future reductions.
Eq. 31 helps frame issues surrounding climate change mitigation. But it is only a
mathematical identity and, as such, it does not directly allow for dynamic interactions
between terms. What the link expressed in Eq. 20 between current consumption and the
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economy provides is an added strong constraint on interrelationships between population,
standard of living, and production efficiency. For example, inserting Eq. 20 in C = cE
yields that current carbon dioxide emissions can be related to past accumulated economic
production through
C (t) = λc
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′ (32)
A revised expression then follows for Eq. 31, namely
ηC = ηc + ηE = ηc + λε (33)
where we used Eq. 27.
A test of Eq. 33 is shown in Table 3, based on the values for λε shown in Table 2 and
data from the Global Carbon Atlas [33]. Between 1980 and 2010, the observed average
annual rate of emissions growth ηC was 1.77 % yr
−1, within 6% of the calculate value of
1.88 % yr−1 for ηc + λε. For more recent years, the discrepancy is 20%.
Table 3. Average growth rates in carbonization and CO2 emissions (%/yr). Rates
derived assuming λ is a constant are shown in bold, and pertinent equations in
parentheses. The units of C/W are Gt C yr−1 per quadrillion 2010 USD.
Scaling (Eq. 32) Carbonization c = C/E CO2 emissions C
C/W = λc (±std. dev.) ηc ηC ηc + λε (33)
1980-2010 1.50±0.06 -0.21 1.77 1.88
2010-2017 1.45±0.05 -0.36 1.25 2.04
1980-2017 1.49±0.06 -0.25 1.59 1.90
Similarly, the revised identity for CO2 emissions given by Eq. 33 implies that
ηP + ηg = λε+ ηε (34)
A test of this relation is shown in Table 4. For the 1980 to 2017 time period, the
difference between both sides of the equality in Eq. 34 is about 10%. Also, note that
over the longer term ηp and ηg are remarkably similar. If n˘ can be related to population
and µ to standard of living, this empirical result is consistent with the thermodynamic
relationship given by Eq. 15 with k = 2.
Table 4. Average growth rates of population and standard of living (%/yr). Summed
rate derived assuming λ is a constant from efficiency estimates are shown in bold.
Population Standard of living Summation
ηP ηg ηp + ηg λε+ ηε (34)
1980-2010 1.45 1.43 2.88 3.0
2010-2017 1.10 1.68 2.78 3.58
1980-2017 1.38 1.46 2.84 3.15
As discussed, the production efficiency can be related to the energy efficiency through
ε ' / (λτd). This suggests that, whether it is CO2 emissions, population, or standard
of living, it is the fractional imbalance between energy consumption and dissipation
that drives growth. A surplus enables irreversible work to be done to make more of
everything, including people, and speeding it all up. Moreover, current efficiency levels
arose from an accumulation of prior innovations:
ε =
∫ t
0
dε (t′)
dt′
dt′ (35)
so a conclusion might be reached that it is current and past improvements in production
efficiency that have driven current growth in emissions, population, and standard of
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living. Population and emissions growth rates have inertia because the world has memory
of its past innovations.
4.2 Emissions stabilization and climate change mitigation
So what can be done to reverse the course of growing CO2 emissions? Eq. 33 suggests
that stabilizing carbon dioxide emissions will require the economy to decarbonize at a
rate ηc = −λε that is as fast as the rate of energy consumption growth ηE = λε. In the
period 2010-2017, we observed λε to be about 2.4% per year (Table 2). For a sense of
what this implies, consider that 2.4% of the current global rate of energy consumption
E ≈ 20 TW corresponds to 480 GW. That is to say, for energy consumption to grow
at this rate without increasing carbon dioxide emissions would require over 1 GW of
new power capacity in nuclear or renewable energy to be added online each day, the
approximate size of a large central power plant2.
Furthermore, stabilized emissions do not lead to stabilized atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations, not until there is a balance with natural uptake by the land and oceans. As a
crude approximation, land and ocean sinks are linearly proportional to the perturbation
∆ [CO2] from pre-industrial concentrations of approximately 275 ppmv [34]. More so-
phisticated approaches are possible that permit accurate projections over multi-century
timescales [35].
Nonetheless, a simple model readily lends insight to near term evolution while
remaining consistent with multiple decades of observations. Data show that the linear
sink rate σ to the land and oceans with respect to the decadally averaged perturbation
∆ [CO2] was 2.3± 0.5 % yr−1 in the 1980s, 2.4± 0.4 % yr−1 in the 1990s and 2.2± 0.4
% yr−1 in the 2000s [36]. There is no inter-decadal trend and the uncertainty is greater
than the variability. Thus, an average value of 2.3± 0.4% yr−1 is assumed here.
The effect of carbon emissions on atmospheric CO2 concentrations can be obtained
by normalizing by the atmospheric mass. Every gigaton of emitted carbon corresponds
to 0.47 parts per million by volume (ppmv) of increased CO2 concentration [37]. The
approximate balance equation is then
d∆ [CO2]
dt
= κC − σ∆ [CO2] . (36)
Substituting Eq. 32, carbon dioxide emissions can then be related to past economic
production and the carbonization of the energy source c through the integro-differential
equation
d∆ [CO2]
dt
= κλc
∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′ − σ∆ [CO2] (37)
Taking κ and λ as constants then stabilization or reduction of concentrations at any
given perturbation value ∆ [CO2] requires the following limits on the carbonization of
emissions
c ≤ σ
κλ
∆ [CO2]∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′
' 0.26∆ [CO2]
W
(38)
where c has units of Gt C EJ−1, W has units of trillion 2010 USD and the numerical
coefficient σ/ (κλ) ' 0.26 has units of (Gt C)× (trillion 2010 USD)× (ppmv−1)× (EJ−1).
Recent values for c are close to 0.017 Gt C EJ−1, and despite a recent surge in
renewables, c is not rapidly declining [38]. As shown in Table 3, the annual decarboniza-
tion rate ηc in recent years is just 0.36% yr
−1 and the correspondence between CO2
emissions C and cumulative global production W expressed as C/W = λc has effectively
2The corresponding figure using ηE = 1.6% directly (Table 2), instead of the value λε = 2.4%, is 320
GW, or just under 1 GW of new power capacity in renewable energy per day.
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been unchanged over the past four decades. Based on these observations, to develop
an intuition for constraints on the future, we take the baseline assumption that λc will
remain fixed. In this case, Eq. 37 implies a straightforward proportionality relating
the world cumulative production W and the equilibrium value for the concentration
perturbation ∆ [CO2]eq. Setting d∆ [CO2] /dt = 0 it follows that:
W =
σ
κλc
∆ [CO2]eq ' 15.4∆ [CO2]eq (39)
Here, the numerical coefficient σ/ (κcλ) ' 15.4 is obtained from the years 1980 to 2010
and has units of trillion 2010 USD ppmv−1. Values of this coefficient for different periods
are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Average values of the scaling W/∆ [CO2]eq = σ/ (κcλ) defined by Eq. 39 for
various time periods, in trillion 2010 USD ppmv−1
Period 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 1980-2010
σ/ (κcλ) 15.0 16.3 14.9 15.4
Comparing Eq. 39 with Eq. 18 we obtain
∆ [CO2]eq '
κc
στd
G
Effectively, at equilibrium with land and ocean sinks, civilization’s combustion garbage
heap in the form of an atmospheric CO2 perturbation is linearly proportional to how
far thermodynamically it has stretched itself away from the environmental base state of
G = 0. Both rise as our collective historical achievement.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the world cumulative production W and
CO2 concentrations, both for the past 2000 years and for the future assuming no future
decarbonization and that energy consumption persists at its current growth trend of
2.4% yr−1, a conservative estimate perhaps given that it implies an equivalent rate
of world GDP growth (Eq. 30). That is to say, the open circles for each future date
correspond to the non-equilibrium values for CO2 concentrations derived from Eq. 37
assuming that W grows at the constant rate ηW = λε. In addition, for each value of W
the set of solutions is provided for the CO2 concentration at which emissions stabilize
with land and ocean sinks by applying Eq. 39, namely the equilibrium concentration
to which civilization is committed even for the mathematically extreme case that W
were to remain constant (in other words, not only zero GDP growth, but effectively zero
inflation-adjusted production).
The equilibrium CO2 concentration is approached asymptotically with timescale
τCO2 = 1/σ, so that the difference is halved in about 30 years. For example, Figure 4
shows that stabilizing concentrations at a nominal value of 350 ppm would require that
the current world cumulative production shrink by two thirds to a value not seen since
1960.
It is probably safe to assume that civilization will not willingly engage in such drastic
pruning. Looking to the future, Figure 4 shows that without rapid decarbonization, we
have already committed ourselves to CO2 concentrations above 500 ppmv, well in excess
of the 450 ppmv threshold that has been deemed “dangerous” [42]. At current growth
rates, the commitment is to a doubling of pre-industrial levels by 2030, and to levels
close to 650 ppmv by 2040.
5 Conclusions
This article identifies a persistent relationship between global energy consumption and
cumulative economic production. It implies that a surprisingly simple description of the
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Fig 4. Historical reconstructions of world cumulative production W and atmospheric
CO2 concentrations with projections assuming ηc = 0 and ηE = ηE (2017) = 2.4%yr−1
(circles) and corresponding stabilization concentrations from Eq. 39. The halving time
between predicted and committed is about 30 years. Concentration data includes flask
samples from Mauna Loa [39] and Antarctic ice core data [40,41].
human system is sufficient to explain past global trends and make robust projections
of the aggregated world economy and its waste products. Humanity grows when more
energy is available than required for daily needs. Then work can be done not just for
sustenance but for expansion. Because current sustenance demands emerge from past
growth, inertia plays a much more important role in determining future societal and
climate trajectories than has been generally acknowledged, particularly in the physically
unconstrained models that are widely used to link the economy to climate [43,44]. We
have accumulated over history a long series of innovations in efficiency that continue
to propel us forward. Without forgetting these advances, we will maintain a continued
ability to expand our interface with the primary resources we consume.
Eventually, of course, the interwoven networks of civilization will unravel and emissions
will decline, whether it is through depletion of resources, environmentally forced decay
or – as demonstrated recently – pandemics [45]. But the cuts will have to be deep,
continuous, and cumulative to overcome the tremendous accumulated growth we have
sustained up to this point.
The formulations presented here are intended to help constrain the problem by
reducing the number of available targets that can reasonably be expected to lead to
avoidance of extreme climate change. Notably, gains in energy efficiency play a critical
role in enabling increases in population and prosperity, and in turn growth of energy
demands and carbon dioxide emissions, contrary to what would reasonably be assumed
if civilization did not grow [31,46,47]. What seems to be required is a peculiar dance
between reducing the production efficiency of civilization while simultaneously innovating
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new technologies that move us away from combustion.
The relationships identified all stem mathematically from the falsifiable identify
E = λW where W = ∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′. While the specific value of λ that was identified is
5.9±0.2 gigawatts per trillion 2010 US dollars, what matters from the standpoint of
calculating trends is that the ratio E/ ∫ t
0
Y (t′) dt′ is a constant to within observational
uncertainty. Further theoretical work is required to link the relationship to more
traditional macroeconomic modeling frameworks. Continued observations will provide a
useful check on its validity. Any evidence of a sustained downward trend in λ help to
pinpoint where there is a decoupling of economic production from civilization’s metabolic
needs.
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A Calculation of cumulative production
Market exchange rate estimates of Yi, inflation-adjusted to “real” constant year 2010
dollars, are available from the World Bank and the United Nations for the years between
1970 and 2017 [17, 18]. Estimates of real GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity
(PPP) 1990 USD are available for each year between 1950 and 1992, and in larger
intervals extending back to 1 CE [19]. To calculate W these estimates are converted to
market exchange rate MER inflation-adjusted 2010 values. For the time period between
1970 and 1992 for which concurrent MER and PPP statistics are available, the mean
inflation-adjusted ratio PPP/MER is κ = 1.205 with no clear trend.
A historical reconstruction of the annual global GDP is obtained by dividing the
Maddison PPP values by κ between 1 C.E. and 1970 C.E, applying a cubic spline between
sparse data points to obtain annual values, and using World Bank statistics for more
recent years [17]. The value of world cumulative production W is then
W (t) = W (1) +
t∑
1
Y (t) (40)
where W (1) refers to total accumulated world cumulative production to date in 1 C.E.
To obtain a value for W (1), it is assumed that W and world population grew equally
fast at that time. Available statistics suggest a population in ca. 1 C.E. [21] that was 170
million and growing by 10 million every hundred years, at a rate of ηpop =0.059 % per
year. The estimated value for the real MER GDP in 1 C.E. is 0.147 trillion 2010 USD.
Assuming that civilization population and wealth grew at the same rate, i.e., ηpop = ηW ,
then from Eq. 19 it follows that W (1) = 250 trillion 2010 USD.
One criticism might be that MER dollars should be adjusted to PPP dollars [48]
since market exchange rates fail to account for differences in how people in different
countries value equivalent baskets of goods. One rebuttal has been that such equivalents
do not exist because different cultures value goods differently and that any discrepancies
tend to diminish over time with a half life of three to five years due to the pressures
of international and domestic trade [49]. In the case of the work here, there is another
counter-argument which is that there is no intent to address short-term inequalities
between nations, only the global sum of all of civilization and its evolution over they
long-run. Effectively, there is only one “basket of goods”, and that is humanity taken as
a whole, including all its social and physical networks.
Rates of global primary energy consumption from all sources E are available from the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the
time period 1980 to 2016 and from British Petroleum between 1965 and 2017 [10,20].
Rates of global primary energy consumption and production provided by the EIA have
a mean ratio of 99.83% so here it is assumed that the two are equivalent.
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